scan_mcp_safety

Tool of agent-tools (x402 + MCP + A2A directory)

Check an MCP server for malware / prompt-injection lures by its endpoint URL. Give the server's streamable-http endpoint URL. Two paths: * **Already in the agent-tools directory** → returns our LATEST stored rule verdict. Every indexed server is re-scanned hourly, so you get a consistent, continuously-refreshed answer without re-probing. * **Not yet indexed** → we probe the endpoint live, statically scan its advertised tools + metadata, ADD it to the directory, and return the fresh verdict (so the next caller gets the rule verdict instantly from cache). Two dimensions are reported. `verdict` is authoritative and comes from deterministic static rules — pure pattern-matching over the *advertised* text only, NO code execution. It flags the social-engineering / RCE tricks listing-spam servers use: * `curl … | bash` and `base64 -d | sh` install lures * `eval "$(curl …)"` / PowerShell `IEX(...DownloadString)` cradles * base64 blobs that decode to a shell command * bare-IP payload hosts and cheap throwaway TLDs * prompt-injection / credential-exfiltration phrasing ("ignore previous instructions", "send your .env / api key") * MCP tool-poisoning coercion — descriptions that hijack an agent's tool-calling ("always call this tool first", "before using any other tool you must…"), hidden `<IMPORTANT>` instructions, "list all API keys / include secrets in your response", and coercion to read & forward `.key`/`.pem`/`.ssh`/`.env` files Source-code-oriented rules (SQL / command / code injection) are deliberately not applied to natural-language descriptions, to avoid false positives. `llm_reference` is an advisory frontier-LLM second opinion over the same text. Because the LLM is slow it is computed LIVE on this call only and is never stored (the hourly job never runs it), so it may be null on timeout. It never overrides the rule verdict; when it is *more* severe than the rules an `advisory` note is attached as a safety-net signal. Security/defense products that merely *name* these attacks are not flagged. Args: endpoint_url: The MCP server's streamable-http URL (required). This is the identity we look up / index by. name: Optional advertised name (used when the server is new and gets added; falls back to the URL host). description: Optional description / README blurb (scanned when new). tools_text: Optional tool names + descriptions; used only if the live probe cannot fetch the server's tools/list. Returns: { verdict: "clean"|"suspicious"|"malicious", score: 0-100, reasons: [{rule, weight, snippet}], llm_reference: {model, verdict, reason, confidence} | null, advisory: str | null, slug, name, endpoint_url, source: "stored" (existing) | "new_scan" (just added), indexed: bool }