btc-game-theory
ActiveTool of The Stall
declared in 4.82.0
Bitcoin mining game theory and systems dynamics in one call. Returns: selfish-mining profitability threshold (Eyal-Sirer), 51%-attack electricity cost estimate, fee-vs-subsidy revenue split, difficulty epoch trajectory (expansion / contraction / neutral), Nash-equilibrium state for honest mining, and current epoch progress. Sourced from mempool.space and CoinGecko — no API key required. Use for miner-incentive analysis, network security assessment, and pre-investment regime detection.
Parameters schema
{
"type": "object",
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"properties": {
"connectivity_gamma": {
"type": "number",
"description": "Assumed fraction of honest miners who extend the selfish chain when block heights are equal (0–1). Higher γ means better-connected selfish miner. Default 0 (worst-case for honest miners)."
},
"efficiency_w_per_th": {
"type": "number",
"description": "Assumed ASIC power efficiency in W/TH. Default 20 (representative of modern S21/M60 hardware). Lower = more efficient attackers."
},
"electricity_kwh_usd": {
"type": "number",
"description": "Assumed electricity cost in $/kWh for 51%-attack cost estimate. Default 0.07."
}
},
"additionalProperties": false
}Parent server
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